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CONTENTS

The Case of Glackens vs. Renoir <i>by Violette de Mazia</i>	3
On Style and Responsibility in the Professions <i>by Gil Cantor</i>	31
Illustration and Aesthetic Expression <i>by Ellen Homsey</i>	39
Curriculum of the Art Department	96
Publications Authored by Members of the Art Department Staff	96
Illustrations: Corner of Main Classroom Plates 1 to 43	<i>Frontispiece</i> 53-95

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Corner of Main Classroom of The Barnes Foundation School of the Art Department

JOURNAL *of* THE ART DEPARTMENT

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The Case of Glackens vs. Renoir*

by VIOLETTE DE MAZIA†

THE strong resemblance which the work of William J. Glackens bears to Renoir's illustrates, in the field of painting, a human phenomenon of a quite natural and frequent occurrence—namely, that of specific individuals' being extremely fond of, attracted by and enthusiastically responsive to very similar categories of qualities or aspects of things and situations in the world and seeking them wherever they may be found. Indeed, it is questionable whether any two painters ever had a greater measure of temperamental affinity and, *up to a point*, ever saw eye to eye more compatibly than did Glackens and Renoir. Critics lacking any understanding of the complexity of aesthetic expression, and of the multiplicity of functions to which the term is applicable, have, upon observing certain common elements in their work, alleged that Glackens was a mere imitator of Renoir, that, in essence, he tried to do what his predecessor had done and that he could not "make the grade."‡

* Adapted from author's class lectures.

† Director of Education.

‡ Since this criticism sets up Glackens' mature work against Renoir's paintings done after the 1870's, the comparisons made between the two men in this essay will refer to Glackens' most characteristic canvases and to Renoir's form as it crystallized in the latter part of his career—specifically, between the late 1880's and 1919. The artists' dates are: Glackens, 1870–1938; Renoir, 1841–1919.

It is an obvious fact that Glackens' mature painting resembles Renoir's; Glackens' staunchest admirers do not deny it, and he himself never tried to conceal or disavow the influence Renoir had on him. The problem for the interested viewer created by the similarity between the work of different artists is one which commonly arises in the study of the traditions of painting: it is to determine, by objective observation of the relevant evidence, whether a painter attempted to imitate what he saw in other artists' work or whether what he accomplished *by means of* what he learned from the prototypes stands by itself as a personal contribution to art because of its particular content of individual, aesthetic attributes. Thus, the specific question we shall be concerned with here is: did Glackens set up Renoir as a model to duplicate as best he could, or did he look upon him in relation to his, Glackens', own efforts as a source rich in some of the very things he was seeking, and was he at the same time able to utilize creatively what he selected from Renoir's form as a means to express, in terms of qualities intrinsic to his medium, the significance of his own experience? In short, was Glackens simply another of Renoir's imitators, a plagiarist, or was he a genuinely creative artist, albeit strongly influenced by Renoir?

The vital principle governing an intelligent answer to this question is that the adaptation of any material to a distinct purpose involves molding that material into the means best fitted to serve that purpose and, furthermore, that in such purposive use the original identity of the material employed is inevitably modified; a hammer, for example, used to pound a nail in does not have the same meaning, is not the same thing, as that hammer used—differently, of course—to pull a nail out. With regard to the relationship between Glackens and Renoir, as we shall see, though the two artists are quite similar in some of their general characteristics, they appear in other respects similar only to those who are unable to distinguish superficial effects from essentials. Such viewers fail to grasp that the significance of the total form of any artist's work results only from specific and purposive selection, handling, coördination and integration of *all* the individual components.

As their paintings reveal, both men were acutely sensitive to and in ready sympathy with the joyfully pulsating life of everyday scenes and incidents, and they rejoiced in its highly sensuous, luxuriant colorfulness and fresh, warm sparkle. Hence, the natural inclination on the part of Glackens towards the work of an artist whose aesthetic enjoyment and preferences were so congenial to his outlook. It was likewise natural, and indicative of intelligence besides, that Glackens consulted and closely studied Renoir's technical resources in order to learn how Renoir had expressed, in terms of color, reactions to the world about him similar to Glackens' own. This corresponds to the logical behavior of intelligent students in all fields of human activity, in art neither more nor less than in science, trade, athletics or any other pursuit: we learn much—that is, we are able to do well or better than we have done what we wish to do—by exploring and experimenting with what others have accomplished along the line of things that interest us, if at the same time we perceive the possible adaptations of what has already been accomplished to what makes the distinctive subject of our interest uniquely ours.*

However, common knowledge tells us that no two persons are ever completely alike, that their responses are never identical; the differences are determined by variations in background, environment, experience, interest, sensitivity, physiological equipment and psychological makeup. As an instance of an everyday sort of experience, not without its parallel to the situation of Glackens and Renoir, let us take two persons very fond of peach ice cream. Only two unimaginative devotees would coincide in remarking that it tastes good and that they like it. Were they able to communicate accurately to other people the character and quality of their individual pleasurable experience, the words selected by each would differ, their intonation and facial expression would not be the same nor would the gleam in their eyes, as each brought out about the identical thing they both enjoy a varied combination of facts, aspects, qualities and details.

* See John Dewey's essay, "Individuality and Experience," *Art and Education*, The Barnes Foundation Press, Merion, Pa., 1954, pp. 32-40.

Still another cause for variation, and one which has further analogy to the difference between Renoir and Glackens, might be one person's relishing a dish of ice cream as the finishing touch to a meal and the other's finding particular delectation in making of it a meal in itself.

The following analytical comparison between the work of Glackens and Renoir proposes, first, to investigate wherein their resemblance lies; then, to see how far it goes, what it encompasses, where it stops; and, finally, to determine where they diverge and what, if anything, in the case of Glackens goes on from there. This analysis will reveal that in diverging as he did from Renoir, Glackens quite naturally chose and followed an entirely different path, and that in so doing he achieved a new, creative, personal and distinctive aesthetic expression, one entitled to respect whether or not he sought to reach the aesthetic height attained by Renoir.

Glackens' most obvious indebtedness to Renoir—a point which leaps to the eyes of even the most casual observer—is a general character of color scheme. Seizing on this resemblance, most of Glackens' detractors have claimed that his overall color effect comes too close to Renoir's without at the same time achieving all that Renoir's achieves—a criticism which says, in effect, that Glackens simply couldn't do it, stopped halfway and is, therefore, but a superficial Renoir. An objective study competently carried out discloses, however, that this adverse opinion has no foundation in verifiable facts. The longer and more searchingly the paintings of both artists are scrutinized, the more this impression of resemblance is qualified and, indeed, all but fades away.

There is no denying that the pervasive colorfulness of Glackens' paintings—their rich, luxuriant brightness, the sparkling luminosity, the singing vibrancy combined with a voluptuous, flower-like freshness and delicacy in the hues and tones—and a fluidity and gentleness in the drawing are qualities very much like those that identify Renoir's color effects, and, at first blush, they make Glackens' color design seem almost a replica of Renoir's. It is likewise a fact that Glackens' color, rich as it is, has not the peculiar warmth, the distinctive velvety voluptuousness of Renoir's, nor has it the same degree of interfusion of subtly differentiated

hues in the color-chords:^{*} examination of a square inch of canvas in each reveals the relative aridity of Glackens' color, with its chords falling far short of Renoir's from the standpoint of the latter's extraordinarily varied intermingling of both hues and tones. Moreover, it is also true that Glackens' color is not so subtle as Renoir's, his handling of it and its results being comparatively simple. An area in Renoir, for instance, which functions in the general framework as a mono-colored unit—a red blouse, a blue drapery, a white tablecloth—usually is found upon inspection to consist of an amazing number of densely interweaving, variegated color-chords, and it is often a wonder, in the light of the apparently complex multiplicity of contrasting constituents, that the needed one-color dominance is still unmistakably obtained. With Glackens, corresponding areas are internally varied by contrasts of *tones* rather than *hues*, which former blend or fuse less freely and smoothly into each other than do the hues in Renoir and are, consequently, more individually discernible; thus, in Glackens the dominant color of an area is made of easily perceptible and comparatively large tonal variations of the particular color used.

Renoir was one of the supreme masters of color, especially in the structural[†] use of highly decorative color, and in this respect Glackens followed him only at a considerable distance. Indeed, in comparison with Renoir, Glackens' color lacks the degree and kind of solidity, of depth, which in Renoir makes the color so much an integral part of the texture and structure of the fully three-dimensional volumes

* A "color-chord" is a small area of painted canvas in which two or more juxtaposed colors overflow into each other: for example, red and an adjacent blue with reciprocal interpenetration constitute a "color-chord" of blue and red, not a single note of purple. This phenomenon of "chording" is by no means unique to painting; indeed, it is probably more familiar as it occurs, with similar possible expressive effects, in music; other instances of it may be found in cooking, with the "taste-chords" that result from coördinated flavors (for example, a sweet-and-sour dish) or judicious seasoning, and in speech, with such "sound-chords" as the diphthong in the word "toy." In general, chording tends to contribute elements of subtlety and richness.

† Color may be said to be "structural" when it conveys the sense of its being an organic constituent, an integral part of the texture and basic structure, the underlying substance of the depicted unit—an area or a volume. The opposite of structural color—surface identification only—might be termed "labeling" color.

which it builds up and reports about with conviction⁷ and strength. Taking a general view of Glackens' work, the color as against Renoir's does not achieve the same degree of structural character.

No critic of Glackens is more acutely aware of this than he was himself, and a part of his energies as a painter was directed toward finding a way to make his color an organic part of the basic structure, the internal substance of his masses. It is untrue, however, that his persistent striving for more deeply structural quality of color was motivated by the idea that, could he attain it, his painting would be like Renoir's to a greater extent: his pictures "Still Life" (Plate 1), "Zinnias" (Plate 2), "Roller Skaters" (Plate 3), and "Torso" (Plate 4), for example, in which color is successfully structural, are not more like Renoir in terms of the latter's total expressive form than are those Glackens' which do not reach that degree of color solidity. The point is that, had Glackens found it easier to make color a more deeply ingrained component of his units, he would not have been more like Renoir; he might, however, have been able to accomplish more readily what *he*, Glackens, set out to do, which, as we shall see, was something Renoir never, or hardly ever, did or was interested in doing. And still the most important question remains—whether an ability to build up the color units in terms of structural, fully three-dimensional volumes on a par with Renoir's would have served the successful accomplishment of Glackens' intent or whether the degree of color solidity he achieved was not, in fact, at one with *his* interest as an artist.

If we were content to stop the comparisons before considering the above question—as Glackens' critics usually are—our conclusion about his artistic stature would be based solely upon objective observations of what his color *lacks* that Renoir's has. Such judgment rests upon only a fraction of the evidence, and to dismiss Glackens on the basis of it is, therefore, completely inappropriate. That would, indeed, be as irrational and as indefensible as, for instance, condemning Cézanne on the grounds that, while he obviously organizes his compositions in terms of solid color volumes in three-dimensional space, as Renoir does, he totally fails to make his volumes appear light and delicate and his color sparkling and

cheerful. Nor would our premature verdict be any less ridiculous if we were to reject a kumquat as unfit for any further consideration because—our parallel argument would run—a kumquat, though a citrus fruit like an orange and though sharing a number of characteristics with oranges, fails to yield in its exotic piquancy the sweet flavor peculiar to oranges and thus is to be considered as nothing more than an orange that does not succeed in being one.

The fallacy of the argument in the Glackens-Renoir, Cézanne-Renoir, kumquat-orange instances lies in the double error, first, of taking as a major premise an already foregone conclusion about the intrinsic nature of the thing we are supposed to investigate, and, secondly, of confining our observation to only those factors which support and confirm this arbitrary (and false) premise. This type of arrested perception, so prevalent a fault among prejudiced art critics who see only what they wish to see or what beforehand they have decided they shall see, fails completely to grasp the fact that the kumquat, with all that it has in common with the orange and with all that it fails to have that the orange has (indeed, much *because* it lacks some of the orange's features), possesses its own distinctive and valuable properties—its size and shape, for instance, and its exotic tang—that are absent from the orange or any other citrus fruit: in short, it has a positive identity all its own. Likewise, the color effects in Glackens, which at one and the same time are reminiscent of, yet different from, Renoir's, offer a set of aesthetic attributes incompatible with at least some of those features distinctive of Renoir and absent in Glackens. We may now consider specifically the different characteristics, and the functions they serve, in the form of each of these artists.

A comparative study of the constituents of the respective color schemes of the two artists reveals color units that are typically of Glackens and that yield effects radically different from Renoir's. Glackens' sonorous reds, his orange tones, his tawny browns, his intense, saturated blues and, especially, his acidic greens are rarely seen in Renoir; and when the latter's colors appear to be similar to Glackens' they are so modified by the relatively small size of the areas,

by the color context and the fluid, transparent pigment which fuses them with the environing color-chords, that they lose their original color identity. In Glackens, on the contrary, the non-blended relationships between the colors emphasize rather than diminish the resonant identity of each hue, and these relationships are as much responsible for the total color effects as are the individual colors themselves. In Glackens, the blues, greens and orange-reds dominate as units of color and qualify the flower-like picture ensemble as, for example, being of a bouquet made up of, let us say, blue cornflowers, red poppies and variegated tulips pointed up by large-leaved, vividly green foliage. In Renoir, instead, one is likely to be reminded of the dainty grouping of delicate sweetheart roses, forget-me-nots and maidenhair fern. Another essential difference between the two color ensembles is, besides the relative lack of rich color-chords already noted in Glackens, his rendering of light as an intensified, scintillating surface illumination that is quite different from Renoir's deeply penetrating, subtle, warm, mellow glow.

The above-mentioned features, individual to Glackens, combine to produce a peculiar color vividness which has a sharp, at times even a slightly piercing, acidity, a bite and an exotic, piquant, tangy flavor usually associated with oriental color effects. "Oriental" also describes a quality of Renoir's color, but when applied to him it refers to what his color embodies of the hot effulgence of tropical, lush scenery bathed in exuberantly sunlit atmosphere. In Glackens, on the other hand, the oriental quality of his color relationships results from what he introduced from Chinese art into the Renoir-influenced color scheme—from Chinese paintings and, more particularly, from Chinese embroidered silks and other fabrics and from the oriental porcelain or chinaware of the orange-and-green type which served as the model for the early Staffordshire soft-paste pieces imported into the United States during the last century.

An additional oriental influence in Glackens' painting appears in a number of his pictures done soon after the New York Armory Show in 1913, when Matisse's work first attracted the attention of the American public, although Glackens had already, prior to 1913, experienced and utilized

effects characteristic of Matisse. Matisse's adaptation of the bold, exotic color contrasts to be found in Japanese woodcut prints produces a vivid color drama which was an entirely new note in contemporary painting. Glackens' "Woman in Red Blouse" (Plate 16), painted in 1913, shows clearly the eye-opening revelation Matisse's color had been to him: the bold and strikingly bizarre color relationships, their dramatic force, the stress upon their decorative vividness and patterns—all these features in "Woman in Red Blouse" indicate a turning point in Glackens' career as a colorist. Likewise does his "Racetrack" (Plate 6),* of about the same date, with its riotous pattern of dramatically contrasting, large areas of hot greens, blues and orange tones. Both these pictures, with their overall boldness, drama and exoticism, testify indubitably to Matisse's part in their conception rather than to Renoir's; moreover, they display as imaginative, creative and personal a blending or synthesis of Matisse's color form with factors from Glackens' own repertoire as do the majority of Glackens' pictures with reference to the borrowings from Renoir.† To the Matisse-inspired exotic drama, Glackens brought his own gamut of bright colors and his own patterned organization. Again, the tawny browns and orange reds, the acidic greens, the saturated blues are his. The use of green in the flesh, not so much in the complexion of the flesh itself as in the shadows and reflected lights, is strictly Glackens', not to be found in either Matisse or Renoir.‡ Appearing already in Glackens' "Woman in Red Blouse," it remained a distinctive and more

* Painted, according to the artist's statement, over a version of the same subject done in 1907 in his earlier somber palette.

† To a person familiar with the developments in the traditions of painting, this influence upon Glackens is a parallel to that, for example, of Pissarro upon Cézanne in the 1870's and to the influence of the Pompeian and Italian Renaissance frescoes upon Renoir in the 1880's. In each case, a new element was assimilated by the artist and made an integral part of his personal form.

‡ This use of green represents an ingenious adaptation of the early Italians' allowing the *terra verde* imprimatura to color the flesh or its shadows. The idea of the distortion may also have come from Matisse, and it may be found elsewhere as well, but not its effect: in Matisse the green is used for color drama; in the Italians, for a subtle richness; in Cézanne, for a facet of cool, receding color; in Lautrec and Picasso, for an expression of weirdness.

or less permanent feature of his flesh painting.* This green often imparts to the flesh a subtle phosphorescent gleam, together with a peculiar sense of translucence and lightness in the shadows, while it adds a piquant note of cool colorfulness by its contrast with the hot reds and yellows. *All these positive features are novel, distinctive, of an aesthetic character and Glackens' own.*

In brief, Glackens acquired from the Orientals and Matisse an exotic flavor which he injected into the color effects derived from Renoir. From Matisse he also acquired the practice of organizing color in a pattern of relatively pronounced individual shapes, just as Matisse had already adapted it from such various predecessors as Van Gogh and Gauguin, both of whom had brought it into the European tradition from Japanese woodcut prints. This is clearly in evidence in "Racetrack" and "Woman in Red Blouse," executed, one might say, under the direct influence of Matisse's work. In Glackens' subsequent paintings, these features vary greatly in degree of accentuation or obviousness, but their presence never fails to alter materially the influence of Renoir. Indeed, an accentuatedly patterned framework of areas is alone sufficient to change radically the character of a color scheme, even if the selected colors were to remain approximately the same; and in Glackens, as has been indicated, both the original Renoir organization and the ingredients of his palette have been de-parted from and im-parted with a set of new qualities, such as the orientally exotic piquancy and drama, the subtly gleaming intensity of light, the semi-translucent quality of shadowed areas and that decorative effect intrinsic to patterned compositions in which the color areas are fairly well marked off from each other.

The fact that Glackens' organizations have a patterned character does not imply that the boundaries of the areas are incisively or sharply clean-cut in the manner of the early Florentines or of Renoir during the 1880's, nor does Glackens bring out their shapes by using the distinct border-band of

* E.g., "Torso" (Plate 4); "Self-Portrait" (Plate 8); "Halley Knitting" (Plate 9); "Nude with Draperies" (Plate 10); "Nude Asleep" (Plate 11); "Head of Girl in Profile" (Plate 17); "The Pony Ballet" (Plate 18).

color typical of the Byzantines, Cézanne, Japanese prints and frequently of Matisse. On the contrary, Glackens found of service to his purpose the Venetian rather than either the Florentine or the Byzantine type of drawing—specifically, the Venetian method as it was usually handled by Renoir, in which color tends to flow from area to area across their line of contact; that line is thus blurred, thereby softening the patterning demarcations, favoring subtlety in color and tone transitions, establishing continuity in surface texture and promoting intrinsic possibilities of ambience. This type of boundary occurs somewhat in all of Glackens' work, largely because of his use of intermeshing brushwork; in "Bouquet" (Plate 5), he carries the effect of ambience to the extreme—suggesting the floating character of the fog-shrouded type of Chinese landscape painting. The most important qualification is that Glackens took advantage of these techniques only insofar as they were compatible with his retention of the desired and necessary compositional emphasis upon the patterning function of the areas.

The preceding description does not mean that compositional patterning of areas is not present in Renoir; it means that in him the pattern as such appears much less pronounced than in Glackens. There are two obvious reasons for this: first, the areas in Renoir are less compartmental (*i.e.*, their boundaries are less sharply defined) because of the continuous, free intermingling of the color-chords as they flow from one area into adjacent areas; and, secondly, the pattern of these areas plays a relatively inconspicuous rôle in the more conspicuous three-dimensional compositional pattern made up of the color volumes and their colorful intervals as their rhythmic sequence recedes from foreground to deep distance. In other words, a Renoir unit is so constructed and so related in space to its companions that our perception is made to focus upon the shape of the three-dimensional unit rather than of the two-dimensional area it occupies on the canvas. In Glackens, the tendency is towards the opposite effect.

It is perhaps in some of Glackens' flowerpieces, for example, "Bouquet" (Plate 5), that the color relationships between volumes and surrounding atmosphere approach the nearest to Renoir's in richness and fulness of color and in

depth of space. But even in these the final composite character of the form has, in general, been considerably lightened and enlivened with dramatic, exotic color notes. The feeling is less of volumes beating their weighty, fluid rhythm in deep, dense spaciousness than of vividly eloquent, colorful units floating in vaporous ambience—an effect recalling at times the work of Redon and even more strongly reminiscent of some early Chinese landscapes, but for its multicolorfulness absent in that type of oriental art and for the ever-present staccato character of Glackens' color punctuations.

To a great extent, the fundamental difference just noted between Glackens' and Renoir's compositional patterns is due to each man's handling of the tonal modulations and color adjustments in general and, more particularly, their respective treatment of color along and across the contour regions of volumes where color is intended to ease the passage from one unit to the other. In Renoir, the subtle tonal transitions carry along with them at every pinpoint modulation in their progression the weight, depth and structural solidity of the unit. The merging thus effected of a color volume and its surroundings involves a considerable amount of deep space. With Glackens, the procedure tends to create a lateral expansion of color over the contour rather than a color flow in pronounced depth. A brief comparison from this standpoint between the relationships of the unit of the arm to its surrounding space in Renoir's "At the Café" (Plate 13) or "Cup of Chocolate" (Plate 28) with that in Glackens' "Torso" (Plate 4) or "Julia" (Plate 12) will corroborate the above general observation. In each of the Glackens paintings, the volume of the arm is relatively shallow, there being but slight indication of a central crest and side recessions in its modeling. As a result, the feeling conveyed by the color flowing over the outline into the neighboring space is of an adjacent rather than an enveloping atmosphere. In Renoir, in contrast, the modeling of the corresponding color volume makes the crest of the arm appear to bulge forward to a point nearer the spectator's eye. This is another way of saying that the space into which the sides of the rounded volume appear to recede is considerably

deeper than it is in Glackens. Moreover, the color relationships in Renoir, everywhere within the mass and in the bordering areas, are such that the illusion is of an atmosphere of dense and deeply glowing color which seems to continue behind the unseen part of the volume and to fill the space in front of it—this to a much greater extent, both in back and in front, than could be said of any corresponding effect in Glackens. A robustness and weightiness entirely compatible with the pervasive delicacy characterize Renoir, whereas the volume in Glackens is relatively slender and light in weight.

The explanation for this difference is not to be sought in the fact that Renoir chose models of ample physique, for the essential points made by the foregoing comparison are equally well sustained when applied to such other representative units as hats or draperies, or even, indeed, to the decorative motifs of the background setting in, for example, Renoir's "Misia Sert" (Plate 15) and in Glackens' "Girl in Green Turban" (Plate 14), "Head of Girl in Profile" (Plate 17) or "Torso" (Plate 4).

It is known, however, that Renoir selected—as is logical for any artist to do—models that possessed most abundantly the qualities he desired to embody in his work. It is equally true that "the eye sees what it has learned to see" (we see what interests us) and that we "see," *i.e.*, *perceive the meaning of* things, in the light of our background. The artist, therefore, by virtue of his specialized interests, background and aesthetic sensitivity, habitually endows any and all objects and situations with the attributes most engrossing to him, whether they exist objectively to the extent and in the manner that he wants them to or only in his imagination. It is in this sense that genuine perception is creative: it brings imaginatively into the newly experienced situation meanings learned from previous experiences; and, in the process, some of our own personality is transferred into the character and significance of the new circumstances. This it is that accounts for Glackens' soft-pedalling the stress on the three-dimensional aspect of volumes and space so that the color areas may function as units of decorative pattern more directly than they do in Renoir; and this it is, also,

that explains why the fluid compositional grace of Renoir is qualified or replaced in Glackens by a brief, though gentle, staccato or pizzicato movement.

From the viewpoint of art, it cannot be said that a staccato beat is "better," more satisfying, than one which is dominantly fluid or that fluidity itself is aesthetically superior to an abruptly punctuated rhythm. Indeed, to proclaim that either type of movement is superior is like saying that Mozart was a greater artist than Beethoven or vice versa. Each type of rhythm has its intrinsic significance and human appeal: neither one can take the place of the other, since the pleasurable response each is capable of awakening is specific to the nature of the rhythm. For example, the tinkling staccato of notes or chords on a piano—which might very well, for the sake of the comparison, stand here for the staccato effects referred to in Glackens—are neither more nor less enjoyable or interesting than the same melody played on a cello—which may here take a place parallel to Renoir's—with its reverberating overtones that vibrate from note to note, thus filling the intervals and tempering the clean-cut quality of the pattern. Personal preferences or interests may dictate a choice but should not pronounce on the final comparative merit. To be in a position to judge of their relative values, one must take into account a number of additional relevant factors—namely, does the musical composition in itself have sufficient merit to warrant its being played; under what circumstances or for what purpose is it being presented; and is full advantage being taken of the respective possibilities of each instrument? Further, one must know whether the potentialities of one instrument are more appropriate for rendering the form intended and whether the performer's decision in favor of one instrument, as well as his manner of playing it, helps bring about the results that fulfill the composer's purpose.

With this we reach the main point of our present problem: is Glackens' message legitimate, worthwhile, deserving of attention? What important circumstances had a bearing upon his artistic development? What were his personal interests as a painter? Which specific aspects and qualities of things did he consequently intend to express in terms of

the qualities of his medium? What means, what instruments, did he select to further that end, and did he draw full advantage from their inherent characteristics? And, finally, are his borrowings from Renoir and others, and his modifications of them, justified by the purpose they helped him to achieve and by the aesthetic merit of the result—that is to say, are they creative?

Thus far, we have in the main noted only that Glackens' color, close as it is in many essentials to its source in Renoir, acquired an identity all its own by modifications which, to a discriminating observer, indicate a divergence in interest and intent. As we have seen, Glackens replaced or modified such characteristic features of Renoir's color as its deeply structural solidity and its exuberant richness and the weighty fluidity, using in their stead his own set of combined effects, which include: a degree of restraint in the function of color in modeling and in the rendering of deep space and atmospheric density; a stress upon the pattern of areas and their staccato relationships; and an unmistakable exotic flavor, which comes from Matisse and oriental art. We may now proceed to investigate the reasons which motivated these changes and the degree of success with which Glackens made them contribute to his aesthetic expression and form.

Long before he came into direct contact with the paintings of Renoir—in fact, in his boyhood days—Glackens' drawings and paintings revealed his natural bent and unique talents. His earliest work in black and white and various color media shows that from the start of his career his principal interest centered upon the picturesque appearance of objects and figures as they participate in everyday occurrences.* The gift for portraying such topics was indeed Glackens' especial forte. From the start, he displayed, together with sharp insight, keen discrimination and imaginative perception, an extraordinary capacity to single out the traits that lend any situation its individual flavor and then to render them by a few briskly-drawn lines, touches of pencil or crayon or color

* E.g., "Shoppers Going about their Business" (Plate 33), of the early 1900's; "Figures" (Plate 34), of c. 1905; "Luxembourg Gardens" (Plate 22), of 1904. Exceptions to his using of subjects drawn from daily life can, of course, always be found, as, for example, in the later "Krishna" (Plate 39).

dabs—so judiciously choosing and deftly applying each stroke that their compositional groupings, which on first acquaintance may seem to be but a simple shorthand memorandum of the subject-facts, communicate directly, concisely and picturesquely the whole story of the pithy episodes.* For all the effect of spontaneity, naturalness and freshness, these sketchily executed, compendious statements represent a triumph of expressive drawing: they give the observer everything that is needed, and nothing that is superfluous, for the realization of the scene or act set before him—being equivalent, in this sense, to the discovery of *le mot juste* by a great literary artist. With complete disregard for conventional or photographic literalism, Glackens applied his terse, epigrammatic style to the depiction of subjects usually distinguished by that dramatic vividness of figures or objects captured in the act of moving; he gives the gist of a situation caught *sur le vif*, on the run, and penetratingly infused with a kind of instantaneous vivacity, often tinged with gentle wit: children playing in the park; pedestrians hurrying across the square; café episodes; a woman pushing a perambulator; skaters in an open-air scene; a young girl trundling her hoop; a Bowery “type” ambling along; shoppers going about their business; an old woman giving “her daughter-in-law a piece of her mind”; strollers in the square†—all these and similar incidents of daily life Glackens enjoyed catching on the quick and recording in

* What Glackens accomplishes in this vein is perhaps more obvious if we compare his drawings to those of other practitioners of the medium. In Glackens each participant in the sketched episode is vitally conceived as an individual lending his individuality to the spirit of the event or situation depicted; he is delineated in such a way that what he is and what he does are conveyed as much through the brisk or slow, broad or delicate, agitated or stolid, etc., character of line, compositional movement, space-unit relationships as through the information the pose itself gives. Against this is the manufactured drawing more usually seen in the work of Glackens' contemporaries—perhaps epitomized in the drawings of Charles Dana Gibson, who fashioned an all-purpose puppet or mannikin, dressed it up as male or female according to the circumstance and mechanically disposed its limbs and features in imitation of the appropriate gesture and expression. In essence, what Gibson gives is mere description of what took place; what Glackens gives is what is taking place here and now, distilled to the pith of its meaning with the same unerring instinct for essentials that one finds in the drawings of Goya, Daumier, Degas and Pascin.

† See, for example, Plates 27, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42 and 43.

terms of the qualities belonging to the essential nature of his color, light, line and space. His typical characterizations, in other words, concentrate upon those features born of, created by, the particular situation or activity which is developing there and then, rather than upon the traits that make that same figure or object what it is in its entirety, independently of the changes occasioned by the momentary posture, action or scene of which it is a part.

All the above-noted distinguishing marks of Glackens' early work constitute what is summed up by the word *illustration*—a term which implies information, its elucidation, the throwing of light upon the nature of a thing or the facts of a situation. Painting which is illustrative may also embody a narrative; it then conveys intimations of what has happened and what is going to happen, as well as what is happening at the present moment. In either sense, illustration is that aspect of a painting which indicates or emphasizes what at a given moment its subject was as such.

Our reference to illustration aims to establish that it was precisely because of Glackens' engrossing and enduring concern with illustration that he consistently and purposively bent all the painter's general resources—his specific knowledge of the traditions, including the work of Renoir, as well as his technical powers—to the greatest possible use in the solution of his own aesthetic problems. There should, however, be no misinterpreting Glackens' stress on the illustrative to mean that he was a mere illustrator. He was, rather, an artist-illustrator—indeed, one of exceptional acumen and ability; for, though he stresses the illustrative aspect in his painting, the other main aesthetic aspects—the decorative and the expressive—more than adequately support the illustrative interest for the realization of a full-bodied plastic entity.

Among the varied early circumstances that sharpened Glackens' interest in illustration and aided considerably in the development of his technique along that line was his acquaintance with the work of some of the most gifted contemporary English illustrators—among them Charles Keene and Phil May—and also his early opportunities to exercise his sharp and quick perception and illustrative skill by being

commissioned to report graphically, for the daily press, events taking place at the Spanish-American war front in 1898. This undoubtedly gave impetus to his natural tendency towards the type of drawing preëminently adapted to record dramatic incident or anecdote. At about this time, Glackens also became widely known to readers of magazines and books through an entirely new type of illustration, so creative, individual and vividly expressive that it deserves a place on a par with the work of Bosch, Goya, Daumier, Degas, Lautrec and Pascin.*

Another factor that left its indelible mark upon Glackens was his early discovery of the work of Manet. Endowed as he was by nature with a flair for the artlessly piquant, the simple gesture or posture by which a man expresses his characteristic impulses or attitudes and the whole unstudied drama of everyday life, Glackens at once recognized in Manet a kindred spirit with whom he shared simplicity and straightforwardness, ease and naturalness. Thus, one of the main reasons for Glackens' attraction to Manet is that, like the French artist, he was preoccupied with the idea of presenting as vividly and concisely as he knew how, the picturesque incidents of daily affairs. Like Manet, he had an innate predilection for topics that provide the opportunity to individualize both the character of the constituent figures or objects and their particular rôle in the activity of the total scene.

Glackens found in Manet, however, much more than a kinship of temperament. He found a type of drawing and a technique which proved to be of yeoman service in the

* As a sidelight, the three illustrations shown in Plates 30, 31 and 32 of Paul de Kock's stories provide an interesting perspective on Glackens' development as a creative illustrator: the first, of 1902, shows him still working in the reigning tradition of Hogarth and such, though it also indicates something of his personal interest and his immense technical ability; in the second, also of 1902, we can already see the emergence of Glackens' characteristic piquancy, crispness, angularity and purposive selectivity; and in the third, of 1904, we find the completely typical angularity, pithy simplification, an expressiveness of the composition as well as of the drawing of the individual figures, etc., which distinguish Glackens' unique and highly creative contribution to the tradition of illustration. Unfortunately, what he originated was seized upon by a legion of imitators and degraded into deadened academic versions which made a wholesale parody of Glackens' distinctive ideas and style by converting them into a set of rigidly stereotyped molds and mechanized formulas.

realization of his, Glackens', personal designs: the flattening of volumes; the simplifying of drawing to minimum essentials of representative units; and the flat, crisp, quickly and deliberately brushed-on strokes, made to yield the maximum of significance and aesthetic effect by their individually expressive shape, size, direction and location, over and above their function in applying the needed color and tone. All these, together with Manet's interest in the episodic aspects of life, in the nearby scenes and in space compositions that are compressed but never cramped, supplied an integral part of the foundation upon which Glackens built and developed his own characteristic form.

As a student, Glackens could not have escaped having his attention drawn to Manet, for at that time teachers and students were making a sort of fetish of Manet's patterning brushwork.* Glackens never fell victim to this craze. (He has been quoted as having remarked that "these painters' ambition is to paint the whole picture with a single stroke of the brush!") Instead of resorting to such technical *tours de force*, Glackens studied Manet's original work and found the answer to some of his particular problems. Glackens' efforts of the early period show that he had learned that the real significance of Manet's technique lies in what it accomplishes as an organic constructive element in his distinctive, tersely expressive drawing; that its attractive surface pattern is an inevitable, natural outcome of its instrumental use and not

* Perverted by Sargent to the level of showy surface decoration, Manet's technique became, for the majority of Glackens' fellow-painters, an easy way of displaying a technical prowess which served as a surface veneer to hide a form empty of ideas. It congealed into a fashion soon to deteriorate into some of the most meaningless, mechanistic tricks and stock-in-trade clichés that painting has ever known. Robert Henri was, perhaps after Sargent, the person most responsible, in America at least, for inflicting this academic plague upon the art of the day through his students, friends and admirers. It lost no time in spreading and contaminating scores of both innocent and willing victims—Sloan, Bellows and Luks, for instance, whose indiscriminate use of the threadbare technique gives to most of their respective paintings the character of a one-factory output. It is still the common trademark, in general, of many of the contemporary "fashionable" portrait painters, who smear and slap the paint on with large, sweeping, slashing, dashy strokes in that ostentatious manner considered "elegant" and "stylish" by the uninformed and easily duped public. The art academies continue to honor it with prizes, and the beguiled public bows to it in reverent awe, as if a magic wand had been wielded instead of the brush.

the artist's primary concern. Henceforth, the basic features of Manet's drawing and technique were incorporated into Glackens' working store, to be used as tools whenever the occasion called for the same general sort of expressiveness the technique had originally been devised to accomplish. Eschewing the showy effects of surface pattern to which Manet's technique can be prostituted with such fatal facility, Glackens employed it for the legitimate purpose of presenting with the utmost vividness, economy and essential fidelity the drama of life as he himself saw it lived all about him, with every character playing his natural part without ostentation or histrionics. Undergoing endless modifications, Manet's technique served Glackens in good stead throughout his career, even though it is often hardly recognizable or traceable to its source because of the color accretions and the variety of specific purposes which dictated the necessary alterations in its character and handling.

In the light of Glackens' basic interests, it is understandable that Manet's personal vision, form and technique should have proved of the utmost value to him. However, even in Glackens' early work, when Manet's influence was least tempered by what he assimilated from other sources and his color scheme of grayish blues, blacks and browns make his derivation from the early Manet most conspicuous—for example, in "Dieppe" (Plate 20)*—even then Glackens' brushwork and, correspondingly, his figures are more active: the individual strokes, while retaining the vigor of Manet's, tend to pull the paint on, and their Manetesque squareness tends to taper off more gradually, thus imparting a swing to their pattern. His touch is lighter, less emphatic; the patches are less sharp; the contrasts of light and dark are less abrupt; and the color is more mellow. In general, the illustrative character is more lively in Glackens, and individual figures are less poised, in more active movement than in Manet, and the movement itself is more animated and varied.†

The above exposition of Glackens' relationship to Manet

* Cf. Manet's "Men Tarring Boat" (Plate 21).

† Cf. Glackens' "Luxembourg Gardens" (Plate 22) and Manet's painting of a similar subject (Plate 23).

has an important bearing on our main thesis—that what Glackens borrowed from Renoir became a significant factor in the identity of his own form. It shows, for instance, that his modified derivations from Manet fulfilled a plastic purpose entirely different from Renoir's. While Renoir, in his early days, also drew extensively upon Manet and retained throughout his career the essentials of Manet's technique and drawing, he adapted them to the rendering of deep universal human values rather than of illustrative effects. The differences, in short, between Glackens and Renoir are a matter of their respective adaptation of means to different ends: for Glackens, the principal concern was illustration, although it never fails to be decoratively presented and expressively stated; for Renoir, it was the merging of all three aspects—decoration, illustration and expression of broad human qualities—which in his form stand on a par with each other.

The Glackens-Manet comparison also explains what it was that Glackens found in Renoir that fell so directly in line with what he needed—*viz*, the means to carry out in terms of bright, luminous color that sprightly aliveness of his illustrations which differentiates his form at the start of his career from Manet's, and ever afterwards from Renoir's: the animation so typical of Glackens' figures depicted *in action* is something very different from the relative immobility of Renoir's figures poised *for action*.

With all this basic difference, however, the same absorbing interest in the multifaceted daily life of all sorts and conditions of men which Glackens had in common with Manet he also had in common, to a higher degree though from a different point of view, with Renoir. This was so partly because Manet's interest was more detached, more aloof than Glackens', but chiefly because Glackens, once he reached maturity, naturally, spontaneously, like Renoir, saw the entire world in terms of color. Indeed, as we shall find, the main thing to be noted about Glackens' work is the fact that what he was at first able to do with line drawing, he was later able to do with color.* Manet's color, particularly in the early work that influenced Glackens, is used for a limited

* See the painting of children in the park (Plate 37) and the earlier drawing of a group of children (Plate 36).

range of functions; especially in decorative and compositional activity, it is not to be compared with Renoir's. And, as we have noted, it was in Renoir's range of color effects, doubtless the most widely varied and richest in the whole history of painting, that Glackens found the wealth of suggestions, the mine of potential material for his own forms, far beyond anything Manet had to offer illustratively. Thus, Glackens' sprightly illustrative drawing became bolstered by sprightly expressive color.

In this respect, too, Glackens also owes something to the adaptation of Manet's technique and feeling for the outdoors that characterized the fully-developed stage of the impressionist movement, of which Monet, Pissarro and Sisley are the other best-known exemplars. These men were primarily interested in rendering the effects of direct sunlight on color and, for this purpose, developed a special technique based on the visible brushwork introduced by Manet, distinguished from the early Manet, however, by the use of thinner strokes that are more varied in their size and by the application of predominantly unblended complementary colors directly to the canvas. The result in their work is an effect of pervasive luminosity, of glowing brightness or sparkle and, often, a jewel-like quality which has no parallel in those of Manet's paintings done prior to the period of impressionism's full development. In Renoir's hands these specific resources in the union of color and light reached heights previously undreamed of; Glackens, too, found in them the tools he needed ready to his hand. His quick intelligence grasped instantly the opportunity thus provided, and he proceeded to elaborate the form in which his native endowment could find complete freedom of expression. In short, he was able for his own purposes to make full use of the impressionist tradition, to which he contributed a new form: he accentuated the color vividness and heightened the decorative appeal by means of the exotic quality derived from the Orientals and Matisse, and he then integrated these new qualities into his own illustrative interpretations of the picturesque incidents of daily life. A typical example of this is his painting "The Raft" (Plate 24), which owes scarcely anything to Renoir but has in common with Renoir's pictures of

the type represented by "Red Boat, Argenteuil" (Plate 25) what both share with Manet, Monet, Pissarro and Sisley.

It is at this point that we arrive at the crux of the relationship between the work of Glackens and Renoir and that we may ascertain what it was that Glackens discovered in Renoir so directly answering his particular aesthetic needs. As we saw, Glackens had indicated from the very beginning, and continued to show throughout his career, that his expressive purpose was very different from Renoir's: his interest centered upon the lively, varied, animated, sprightly character of the here-and-now circumstances and aspects of the everyday life around him—*this flower as it is now, this vase, this girl in this position as part of this situation**—i.e., characteristics that crystallize the meaning of the moment rather than, as in the case of Renoir, the meaning of the thing or situation in its entirety at all times. If Glackens appears to belong to a particular era, to be of a time and place, and if Renoir appears timeless, that difference confirms the divergence in interest—the meaning of things at that moment or their meanings as they always are. This is revealed, for example, by Glackens' diminution of the bulk of volumes, mentioned earlier, in favor of accentuating their shape, for shape more directly than bulk or color indicates direction, and direction is one of the means upon which expression of momentary action or gesture and illustration in general depend. Furthermore, the interplay of a variety of directions makes for that sort of compositional activity that especially interested Glackens—the brisk illustrative activity of the episode. Even when Renoir deals with or suggests figures *in* movement (as in "Bathers in the Forest," Plate 26), he relies considerably more on the compositional activity of the color volumes and a flowing linear sequence linking unit to unit than on the distinctive expressive activity of the individual linear patterns of the figures. Thus, in Renoir the feeling expressed is of an on-going fluidity of fully three-dimensional volumes in an andante tempo, while in Glackens it is a brisk, lively tap-tapping of a light allegro. What Glackens shared with Renoir was a feeling for the joy of life,

* E.g., "Zinnias" (Plate 2); "Roller Skaters" (Plate 3); "Standing Nude" (Plate 19); "Sleeping Figure" (Plate 29).

which in Renoir is conveyed in terms of rich, deeply sensuous color as convincingly, as wholeheartedly, as it ever has been in the traditions of painting. It was the fact that this color could be adapted to the expression of what he himself profoundly felt that attracted Glackens to Renoir's work; and he further, as the creative individual he was, saw in it the possibilities it had for serving as a means in the full realization of his illustrative intent. What he had been able to express through the line drawing, the interplay of light and dark and the activity of brushwork and pattern he found he could also express through the very qualities of color itself—its bright, sparkling, joyous, scintillating, sprightly aliveness—for a fuller, more satisfying statement of his own aesthetic interests.* It is because Glackens was able to impart these qualities in terms of color as well as his other means that his paintings reach that status of highly integrated plastic expressiveness which is the domain of the genuinely creative artist.

We may now sum up Glackens' positive contributions and the distinctive traits of his form. What he has that Renoir lacks is due in large part to what he carried over from Manet and such great illustrators in the traditions as Goya, Daumier, Degas, Lautrec, as well as from Matisse and the Orientals.† Indeed, Glackens' illustrative emphasis has nothing to do with Renoir's work; it shows clearly Glackens' natural bent, one that persists through and governs his use of the traditions—including the work of Renoir. He enlivened the Manet type of illustration by an emphasis upon active representational movement and added a daintiness, an effervescence, a gentle vivaciousness, a mellowness and a graceful sprightliness by means of the fresher color, the colorful light, the pervasive sparkle, the fluid technique and linear drawing which he derived from Renoir's own interpretations of impressionism and the Venetian tradition.

Specifically, Glackens made of color an effectively construc-

* This fact can only be ascertained from studying the paintings themselves; it cannot, unfortunately, in spite of all the technical improvements of photography, be conveyed, or even suggested, by color reproductions, not to mention those in black and white.

† See, for instance, the Chinese Yüan Dynasty wash-drawing "Poet on Mule, with Companion" (Plate 7).

tive means basic to the telling of his story; with its patterning relationships, color is such that it functions as a partner as well as a counterpart to his expressive handling of the other means, all of which reinforce each other and pull together toward achieving the desired overall end. He was, indeed, exceedingly inventive in devising a color vocabulary which in itself is expressive of the very qualities his drawing conveys, and he was ingenious in his successful correlation of that color and that drawing in a single expressive entity. Unlike Renoir, Glackens brings out the identity of individual figures and objects, and this is done as much by way of the expressiveness of the color, discovered though that color may have been in Renoir, as by the patterns, the strokes, the line drawing and the general organization of the composition. In that sense—in the sense that color does *his* bidding—Glackens was, in his own right, a great colorist.

In concluding our study of the case of Glackens *vs.* Renoir, the following analogies may serve to point up the significance of the differences noted—differences, as we have seen, which are due primarily to the relative part played in each by the three main aspects of the painter's form. In Glackens, illustration, which may be termed one of the artist's instruments, has the stellar rôle, but it nevertheless depends for its distinctive character on the support given it by the two other instruments—decoration and the expression of broad human qualities.* In Renoir, the three are approximately on a par with each other in the amount of material contributed respectively to the identity of the total character of his work. With reference to our earlier example of the two devotees of ice cream, we might say that it is Glackens, then, who makes the meal of ice cream and pretzels (not ice cream alone, for his predom-

* By broad human qualities we mean, in general, the properties of things to which we, as human beings, respond for what they are—such properties as power, simplicity, delicacy, gracefulness, etc. In a work of art, they belong to the medium used; thus, Renoir's work expresses, for example, a subtle, decorative richness of color; a gentle solidity of volume; strength, delicacy, grace, depth, fulness of color substance, and atmospheric space, and so on. For a full discussion of the term, see: V. de Mazia, "Aesthetic Quality," *The Barnes Foundation Journal of the Art Department*, Vol. II, No. 1 (Spring, 1971), The Barnes Foundation Press, Merion, Pa., pp. 3-27.

inantly illustrative interest is sufficiently supported by decorative and expressive matter) and Renoir who prefers it as the finishing touch to his meal. Or, again, a composition by Glackens may be likened to a concerto for illustration, and a typical painting by Renoir, to a symphony played with full orchestra. And the meaning of our response to the painting of one and of the other artist varies in a manner paralleling the difference in meaning of our response to, for example, a concerto for violin, in which the violin (as, in Glackens, the illustrative) stands out in relief against the other instruments, and to a symphony played by a full orchestra, in which the violins (as, in Renoir, also the illustrative), though not heard above any of the other instruments, supply matter indispensable to the identity of the whole—*i.e.*, material without which the whole would fail to be, could not possibly be, the specific, meaningful entity it is.

Can we say that the concerto is an imitation, a thin rendering of the orchestral symphony? Or that we get nothing from the concerto that we cannot get in fuller measure, with greater satisfaction, from the symphony? There is no denying the fact that the latter offers a richer, more abundant content of possible values; nonetheless, the qualities peculiar to the simpler concerto, due, indeed, in great part to the fact that it lacks the elaborate orchestration of the symphony, have positive significance and cannot be found in the orchestral piece precisely because of the fulness and complexity intrinsic to it. With this we are obviously again learning the lesson taught us by the kumquat and the orange. Or, as another comparison, we might point to the interest we can take in what belongs to the essential nature of a short story—for example, one by O. Henry—with its simplicity and directness that cannot be found in such works as Huxley's *Point Counter Point* or Galsworthy's *Forsyte Saga* with their numerous involved and intertwined factors in which the individually simple episodes are inextricably woven into a fabric embodying a wealth of other material.

And a final analogy: fresh water and vintage wine. They have much in common, for both are liquids and both have properties that enable them to quench thirst. At the same time, each possesses a distinctive identity: wine has a body,

an aroma, a color, a flavor as against the sparkling clarity, the limpid freshness, the lightness of water. For all that, however, we do not say that water is second-best to wine or that it is merely a vapid imitation of it, for we cannot get from the finest of vintage wines the satisfaction we can derive from a sip of water—pure water, not polluted (as when we refer to aesthetic illustration in painting, we mean illustration not polluted or tainted with propaganda of ideas extraneous to art). There are times, certainly, when water may satisfy completely and wine cannot do so at all—provided, of course, that we do not demand or expect of water what we know wine alone can supply. In brief, neither water and wine nor short story and saga are interchangeable, nor are they subject to measurement of value by any single, absolute standard for the satisfaction of human needs. And, by the same token, neither are concerto and symphony, nor Glackens' paintings and Renoir's. For, indeed, there are times when we may find satisfaction in the simple, direct, vibrant, picturesque, decorative type of aesthetically expressive illustration presented by Glackens that we cannot get from Renoir, in whose work the illustrative aspect is embedded in a wealth of other, perhaps more intoxicating, qualitative meanings.

Renoir compared to Glackens is, of course, the richer, the fuller in aesthetic ideas and achievements and in content of traditional and human values. His abundance of meaning, his profundity and universality, his degree of imaginative creativeness are not to be found in Glackens—or in any other artist, for that matter. This is not, however, to say that Renoir is “better” than Glackens: from the standpoint of picturesque illustration aesthetically rendered, Glackens decidedly surpasses Renoir, in the same sense that water, to quench our thirst, decidedly surpasses the most delectable of vintage wines. Indeed, what Glackens succeeded in doing in his own, more restricted, more specialized and less ambitious field has, like Renoir's contribution, no counterpart in the traditions, either before or since his time.

In sum, critics are correct in noting Glackens' resemblance to Renoir and also in asserting that he did not reach the depth and scope of the latter's form. They are, however,

wholly in error in assuming that his intention was to follow faithfully in Renoir's footsteps. As we have shown, Glackens learned what he could in order to make his own aesthetic statement. He knew what *he* wanted to do and went after *that*, and for what he wanted—the vivid aliveness of here-and-now scenes and situations—he *had* to do without the full three-dimensionality, the deep space, the mellow warmth, the sensuous richness of color that in Renoir became the means of achieving a quite different expressive form. As we have also seen, Glackens set himself the task of realizing a type of statement in which the absence of these characteristics, far from being a serious or fatal impediment, became a valuable resource; and this, as his work reveals, he found in the development of his natural bent for expressive illustration. It is in the light of these facts that Glackens' differences from Renoir take on their true significance: what would have been a hopeless handicap had his purpose been to emulate Renoir was transformed into a positive asset for conveying, as he alone does, the sprightly colorfulness, the vivacious animation, the piquancy of his illustrative themes. And in his rendering of this aesthetic statement, as well as in his use of the contributions of Matisse, Manet, impressionism and oriental art, Glackens is, undeniably, as thoroughly original, as thoroughly creative, as Renoir himself with reference to his, Renoir's, use of the work of his predecessors—Titian, Rubens, the eighteenth century French artists, etc.—for the accomplishment of his expressive purposes. It may legitimately be said that Glackens' work stands in reference to Renoir's not unlike Daumier's does in reference to Rembrandt's.

Thus, as our analytical comparison indicated, Glackens, in diverging as he did from Renoir, took and followed an entirely different path, and in doing so achieved a new, personal and distinctive art-expression, one entitled to respect whether or not it reached the aesthetic height attained by his predecessor. Unfortunately, the superstition that all artists have the same ends in view and can therefore be judged by the same standards of achievement is one that dies hard, and there is no cause for surprise that it should be found lingering on in unenlightened quarters.

On Style and Responsibility in the Professions

by GIL CANTOR*

IT is the purpose of this paper to discover and examine certain of the esthetic aspects of professional activity. The legal profession is used as the chief example; analogies in the other professions should be readily apparent.

While the term "responsibility" is frequently used with a negative or even punitive connotation, as in the responsibility of a person for another's debts or the responsibility of the accused for a crime, and a "profession," indeed, does impose this kind of negative or punitive responsibility on its members, we are using the term here in its more fundamental affirmative sense. Thus, before the professional can be "held" responsible, he "assumes" responsibility. He assumes responsibility in taking on the professional role, and he assumes it in case after case as clients engage him.

"In spite of all similarities," writes Martin Buber (*Between Man and Man*), "every living situation has, like a newborn child, a new face, that has never been before and will never come again. It demands nothing of what is past. It demands presence; it demands you." Again: "I know of no fulness but each mortal hour's fulness of claim and responsibility. Though far from being equal to it, yet I know that in the claim I am claimed and *may respond in responsibility...*" (emphasis mine).

To "*respond in responsibility*": the root term is *response*. One form of response to a situation is that of the artist. The artist discovers in persons and things, and expresses, those qualities which heighten their human significance. "The qualities of real things are drawn out and resynthesized in a form which adds, to the values actually present in the reality, a whole range of others which the artist transfers from remote realms of experience."[†]

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† Barnes, Albert C. and de Mazia, Violette, "Expression and Form," *The Art of Renoir*, The Barnes Foundation Press (Merion, Pa., 1935), p. 32.

This effort of the artist is a part of "the process of adjustment to environment in which all life fundamentally consists."* "Living organisms, from the lowest to the highest, rarely find ready-made in the world the conditions indispensable to their continued existence and well-being; consequently, their greatest concern is to rectify the discrepancy, to establish the conditions which will provide them with what they require."†

The response of the professional, like that of the artist, is part of that process of adjustment. The professional is called upon, in certain immediate and "practical" situations, to rectify discrepancies and to establish the conditions which his client deems essential to his well-being. And the professional "responds in responsibility." The work of the artist is one form, and the work of the professional is another form, of human response to the human demand that the world be "set right."

The response of the professional, however, involves a particular kind of commitment or set of commitments which we should pause to understand. What, then, is a profession?

The three professions originally recognized as such were theology, law and medicine. The list has expanded, and the issue is confused by the modern claim of many callings (insurance counselors, interior decorators, etc.) to professional status and also by the use of the term "professional" to describe the pursuit of various activities on a commercial, as distinguished from an amateur, basis.

It is said‡ that the development of a satisfactory definition of a profession has progressed but little beyond the six criteria proposed by Abraham Flexner in 1915: (1) intellectual operations coupled with large individual responsibilities; (2) raw materials drawn from science and learning; (3) practical application; (4) an educationally communicable technique; (5) tendency toward self-organization; and (6) increasingly altruistic motivation.

* *Ibid.*, p. 21.

† *Ibid.*, p. 21.

‡ Cogan, Morris L., "The Problem of Defining a Profession," *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 297 (Jan., 1955), p. 106.

Morris L. Cogan, after research in the standard treatments of this subject, summarized the essentials of a profession in this way:

A profession is a vocation whose practice is founded upon an understanding of the theoretical structure of some department of learning or science, and upon the abilities accompanying such understanding. This understanding and these abilities are applied to the vital practical affairs of man. The practices of the profession are modified by knowledge of a generalized nature and by the accumulated wisdom and experience of mankind, which serve to correct the errors of specialism. The profession, serving the vital needs of man, considers its first ethical imperative to be altruistic service to the client.*

The professions involve not merely the assumption of responsibility in an open-ended way; they develop *traditions* of response to those situations in which they are called upon to act. These traditions involve knowledge, customs, methods and working standards. They are analogous to traditions in art in that (a) they are essential: they represent "a systematic way of envisaging the world; . . . they record the perceptions of the most gifted observers of all generations, and form a continuous and cumulative growth which is one of the most important parts of the heritage of civilization;"† and (b) they present a danger as well as an opportunity: for the professional, like the artist, "the moment it [tradition] ceases to suggest and begins to legislate, academicism sets in"; the professional, like the artist, is successful "only if he is able to select from the work of his predecessors the forms which are adapted to his own designs, modifying them as his individual needs require, and recombining them in a new form which represents his own unique vision."‡

As in art, new forms of response which appear to derogate, or to be in conflict with, the traditions are at first denounced, but may eventually prevail. Thus, for a current example, a member of the class of '71 at the Harvard Law School writes that "among many law students the most widely

* *Ibid.*, p. 107.

† Barnes, Albert C., *The Art in Painting*, (Third Edition), Harcourt, Brace and Company (New York, 1937), p. 19.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

admired and discussed members of the profession are three individuals who have shattered traditional restraints and established a broader and more intensely human identity as social critics.”* He refers to William Kunstler, Ralph Nader and Frederick Wiseman.

An effective response to a situation involves, for the professional as well as the artist, two intertwined elements: (a) power and (b) style.

Fundamental, “a vague shape like fate above the Greek gods,”† is the *power* to attain the desired end. “The first thing,” as Whitehead tells us, “is to get there, . . . Solve your problem, justify the ways of God to man, administer your province, or do whatever else is set before you.”‡

The power to “get there” may involve many elements, including those of personality, prestige, wealth, office, political connections and, of special interest here, *style*. An example of professional power and style in their highest effectiveness may be found in Chief Justice John Marshall, who established (in *Marbury v. Madison*, 1803) the power of the Supreme Court to declare laws unconstitutional and (in *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 1819) the supremacy, as well as the possibility for the broad interpretation, of federal powers. “He gave permanent shape and structure to what has become the leading nation in the world, and he did it by the inspired use of language. . . . Marshall spoke *ex cathedra*. He did not rely upon authority. He neither remonstrated nor demonstrated. He pronounced—and in propositions so clear and orderly and rational that the debate was over from that time forward even though many people were vaguely uncomfortable about the result. If one recalls the historical circumstances—a young, struggling and uncertain country, divided but hungry for guidance as to how to make its new government work in practice—this was a most fortunate conjuncture of the times and the style.”¶ (Of

* Berenbeim, Ronald E., “An Idea Whose Time Has Come,” *Harvard Law School Bulletin*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (April, 1970), p. 24.

† Whitehead, Alfred North, *The Aims of Education*, The Free Press (New York, 1967), p. 12.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¶ McGowan, Carl, “Lawyers and the Uses of Language,” *American Bar Association Journal*, Vol. 47, No. 9 (September, 1961), p. 899.

power and style, I would prefer to say.)

What, then, is "style," and how does it relate to professional responsibility? Let a renowned "stylist," Pascal, point the way:

Let no one say that I have said nothing new; the arrangement of the subject is new. When we play tennis, we both play with the same ball, but one of us places it better.

Eloquence is an art of saying things in such a way (1) that those to whom we speak may listen to them without pain and with pleasure; (2) that they feel themselves interested, so that self-love leads them more willingly to reflection upon it.*

The nature or "meaning" of style is rendered more plainly by Whitehead:

Style in art, style in literature, style in science, style in logic, style in practical execution have fundamentally the same aesthetic qualities, namely, attainment and restraint. . . .

Style, in its finest senses, is the last acquirement of the educated mind; it is also the most useful. It pervades the whole being. The administrator with a sense for style hates waste; the engineer with a sense for style economises his material; the artisan with a sense for style prefers good work. Style is the ultimate morality of mind.

. . . With style the end is attained without side issues. . . . With style your power is increased, for your mind is not distracted with irrelevancies, and you are more likely to attain your object. Now style is the exclusive privilege of the expert. Whoever heard of the style of an amateur painter, of the style of an amateur poet? Style is always the product of specialist study, the peculiar contribution of specialism to culture.†

Style, then, involves economy of means; it is the "cutting edge" of power; and, as such, it is the key to effectiveness, in the professions as in art.

When we speak of style in professional activity, we refer, actually, to its application at three levels of professional responsibility.

First, we readily recognize the function of style in the effectiveness of particular acts or products. In the legal

* Pascal, *Pensées*, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. (New York, 1958), pp. 6-7.

† Whitehead, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

profession, examples include an address to the jury, the writing of a brief and the preparation of a contract or other document. In a will, the lawyer may wish to translate an archaic expression of a residuary gift, *viz*:

I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, of whatsoever nature and wheresoever situate, to my wife, Mary . . .

into a formulation that is clean, crisp and direct:

I give all the rest of my estate to my wife, Mary . . .

(It should be noted that in order to make the change that *style* indicates, the lawyer must first take the *responsibility* of assuring himself that the verbiage he regards as unnecessary from the standpoint of style is also surplusage from the standpoint of legal effectiveness.)

Second, style is also involved in the total relationship of the professional to his client, for the client's well-being may involve more than the adjustment or "rectification" represented by the technical achievement of the stated objective. Style in the lawyer-client relationship involves a perception of the client as a person and not merely an "accident case" or a "tax case" or whatever. It involves an understanding of the place and meaning of the particular legal problem in the entire range of the client's personal and business concerns. It involves an understanding of the client's needs in terms of the lawyer-client relationship itself, in terms of power, dependence, trust, sympathy and so on. The "fitting" response to such perception and understanding is a matter of style.

And third, beyond the "case," and beyond the client, lie broader professional responsibilities. In the legal profession, these responsibilities include the invention of new legal devices and techniques, the improvement of professional education, needed changes in the structure of the profession and the machinery of justice, the significant expansion or extension of legal services and attention to law-related activities, such as police administration and correctional institu-

tions.* In all of these, as in the handling of an individual client's case, effectiveness depends in part on the "style" of the undertaking.

In legal education attention has been given in recent years to the development of style. In one experimental effort to teach what is called "legal writing," the students received, as their first assignment, the job of describing a certain painting. The second assignment offered some information (who the artist was, why he said he painted the picture) and asked whether the information aided in the process of description. Assignment three introduced a second painting, and the students were asked to compare this with the first one and to indicate why they selected certain features and ignored others in making their comparisons. And so on through six assignments. The purpose was not obscure. "To describe, and to be aware of differences between description and interpretation; to compare, selecting out the significant factors for comparison and understanding why they were significant; these are very much the skills of legal case study."[†]

Thus in the effort to develop the "style" of law students, the course came close to the technique used at The Barnes Foundation for study of the philosophy and appreciation of art. I suggest that the experiment was, in the jargon of today, "relevant."

The professional, like the artist, has a *design* or intention, with at least a general idea of the means to be employed in achieving it. The intention may be to resolve a labor dispute, with or without resort to proceedings for an injunction, or to arrange the acquisition of a certain business in such manner as to give a client the advantage of substantial future tax deductions for depreciation of assets or to arrange for a light or suspended sentence in a criminal case through the entry of a guilty plea.

The professional, like the artist, must develop the form suited to his design or general intention. The organization

* See, for example: Pincus, William, "The Lawyer's Professional Responsibility," *Journal of Legal Education*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1969), pp. 1-21.

† Kirp, David L., "The Writer as Lawyer as Writer," *Journal of Legal Education*, Vol. 22 (1969), p. 117.

of the elements of the form depends on the possibilities of the medium, the imagination of the professional (or artist) and his technical skill. The technical ability both to organize the elements of form best suited to the design and to exclude or diminish the irrelevant is what we mean by "style."

If we are correct in assuming that style has essentially the same meaning for the professional as for the artist—that it is indeed the esthetic aspect of professional activity—then its proper study may well be the study of the philosophy and appreciation of art.

Illustration and Aesthetic Expression

by ELLEN HOMSEY

I

IT is a self-evident fact that humankind is more or less possessed of an abiding need to understand, to establish a revelatory, as well as life-sustaining, relationship between self as a total entity and the surrounding environment—that is, a need to achieve some modicum of spiritual and intellectual, as well as physical, adjustment to the circumstances of existence. For this adventure into knowledge, we have been equipped with a few participatory senses and a natural power of intellectual and emotional responsiveness, through both of which we are able spontaneously to engage in the activities of perception and attribution of meaning (within the bounds of individual susceptibility and resourcefulness) to that which is perceived. In each of these phases of grasping the world, we necessarily impose a point of view—through the former, the type of reality (visual, auditory, etc., and the specific forms of the matter within each area) specified by the various compartments of sensing and, through the latter, the character of that reality (its qualities and attributes) in relation to our possibilities of reaction—which, in essence, “remakes” all its matter and circumstance after our own design. In this respect, the activity of perception and response is inevitably creative; it entails the bringing into being of a new, specific, independent, though “man-made,” actuality—a thought, gesture, feeling, a physical object, a causative force, etc.—and this product has a verity of its own in that it is liable to subsequent perception and response, regardless of whether it be cast in a medium of expression that makes it accessible to the world at large or be held as a private awareness that the creator alone may study. Such productive activity, what we call in its subjective manifestation experience, is always an absolute form of adjustment, however temporary the satisfaction it yields, and always the expression of an accomplished relationship between man and

his surroundings. As such, it is synonymous with understanding, and the created product, an objective entity that embodies and conveys the discoveries attending experience. Education is founded on this fact and on the principle that susceptibility and resourcefulness may change—specifically, that they are capable of being qualified by the ever-increasing complexity of our position to the material around us as the world progressively becomes imbued with the products of our interaction with it.

As these objective products are made communicative of the meanings discovered in experience, they may be divided into two general categories of expressive intent—*viz.*, the practical and the aesthetic. The practical (*e.g.*, an order or explanation) consists, very briefly, in expression for the sake of affecting and altering existing conditions, situations, or things; it is directive or informative in its function, referring the elicited response to something other than its own formal identity, and it surrenders its particular significance as a source of experience when it is effectively understood. Aesthetic expression, on the other hand, is primarily intended for the sharing of an insight, a discovery of meaning *per se*; it is, therefore, qualitative—in other words, the meaning of the actuality embodying aesthetic understanding is one with the immediate activity of experiencing it; accordingly, its expressive significance endures for as long as it retains adequate substance to be available to apprehension.

This is not to say that a given instance of expression may not partake of both kinds of import; indeed, the two human resources for experience—sense perception and responsiveness—may be described as direct correlatives of the two categories of meaning, thus affirming, since both are material to our grasping either purpose, that it could not be otherwise. Aesthetic expression does yield information, and, insofar as that information does not detract from the intent, it functions to enrich the meaning the embodying entity possesses; similarly, the practical can very well afford a measure of immediate enjoyment without forsaking its effective significance. At the same time, however, we must be able to ascertain what is relevant to a manifest understanding if we are to learn from each other, if conveyance of meaning

is to be accomplished between the members of humanity: a military directive, for instance, might conceivably be appreciated for the felicitous character of its word arrangement, but we should also note that the General is not likely to accept the mere compliment to his poetical talents as proper indication that communication took place; nor would Cézanne, in all probability, consider his portrait of Mme. Cézanne understood by a viewer who got from it solely information concerning her appearance, though such information might, in fact, have been recorded with remarkable accuracy. That is to say, the prevailing communicative intent renders certain observations beside the point, despite the fact that they be legitimately derived from the actuality at hand. Furthermore, what is lost in such misunderstanding, if the expressive entity have merit, far outweighs what is acquired, for we thereby forfeit the possibility of sharing in the insight, the understanding, of an intelligence other than our own.

Our concern is to be with aesthetic expression and, ultimately, with the part illustration plays in its realization. The above instance of a viewer's misuse of Cézanne's portrait demonstrates, in perhaps a somewhat exaggerated degree, the kind of error specifically associated with the presence of illustrative content in a work of art—in essence, a confusion of practical with aesthetic import. This confusion, in more subtle but nonetheless equally untenable forms, pervades the study of art, and it is in the hope of unravelling some of the more basic difficulties that the following brief discussion of art's specific communicative intent is made.

II

In ascribing the significance of aesthetic communication to its power to sustain an immediate experience, an existing transaction of perception and response, we should recall that the activity of experiencing consists in the bestowal of human meaning upon the material embodiment—the artist's used medium—of an understanding. What the artist discovers in his medium, and what we discover in an experience of it, is,

therefore, necessarily of a qualitative nature, *i.e.*, having to do with the establishment of a relationship between us and the outside world in terms of our ability to feel pleasure, satisfaction, fulfillment. For the purposes of analysis, we can distinguish between three kinds of values or qualities expressed in the artist's work according to the nature of the satisfaction each furnishes. Those values which we find of direct sensuous appeal, rewarding to the immediate act of apprehending, we call decorative: the glossy, smooth surface and sparkling colorfulness found in a Persian tile, the sonorous cadence and limpid syllables of a line of Poe, the lilting flights in a melody by Haydn belong to this classification. These qualities come about as an effect of the intrinsically appealing characteristics of the medium of expression employed and function in a work of art to capture our interest and to enhance the experience of the created object. The second, expressive values, includes the qualities drawn out of the medium by the artist's particular selection, handling, and organization of its components—such meanings as warmth, coolness, power, delicacy, subtlety, directness, conviction, etc. These qualities represent enactments, externalizations, of our most definitive and deepest emotional, imaginative, and intellectual interests, in that they permeate and qualify those exchanges with the environment of men and matter which make up the substance of everyday life; their subjective counterparts are the variety of complex and more or less profound feelings through which we absorb the outside world and by way of which we extract from it the significant form our lives take. The third of these values derives from the qualities attending the artist's use of a recognizable subject in which to embed the expressive and decorative qualities the medium may be induced to yield—*i.e.*, illustrative values.

However, the illustrative aspect of works of art involves special problems in appreciation, for, although illustration may be presented through any medium, it is not, as are the decorative and expressive aspects, a spontaneous meaning of the medium as a sensible actuality; it is the result, instead, of our acquired proficiency in relating features of one actuality to the whole identity of something to which those features

bear little or no sensible resemblance. By illustration we usually mean the representation, through certain selective, allusive, characteristic attributes or conventionalized symbols, of something that has an independent identity of its own; conveyance of illustrative meaning depends upon our taking in the information about, grasping the allusion made to something not at the moment perceived. Illustration is, in short, referential, thus, natively of a practical significance, and only provisionally capable of being made to afford qualitative meaning. It is because of this that illustration is the most common source of misunderstanding in the study of aesthetic expression—leading not only to such confusions as that of the specious debate over whether the “noble” or the “ugly, sordid, depraved” be a more suitable subject for the artist (when, of course, the subject by itself fulfills not aesthetic, but practical, ends), but, on a larger scale, to the mistaken supposition that aesthetic meaning is synonymous with the information the illustrative provides or, conversely, the rather quaint notion that the avoidance of illustrative content makes for freedom to reveal the “true drama of the inner man.”

These attitudes, and others like them,* fail to be pertinent to an understanding of aesthetic expression because they ignore the qualitative meanings of the present object. In effect, they are as irrelevant to art as the attitude of the viewer of Cézanne’s portrait who confined his attention to the practical import of the picture’s illustrative aspect for what he could get of the identity alluded to. The only possible outcome of such an approach to a work of art is the acquisition of some negligible piece of information, in this instance, about Mme. Cézanne (or, had the viewer lacked special background knowledge, about figure). And this response, though it takes into account what the painter’s medium of color can disclose, what is, in fact, there on the canvas to the sophisticated eye, bears no relationship to a painting as an expressive entity, *i.e.*, as a particular substantiation of an experience of understanding that has been cast in a medium

* Such as iconographical, biographical, historical, sociological, etc., interpretations, which, when they presume to judge of aesthetic merit, also are guilty of the confusion of the informative with the qualitative.

which at once qualifies the meanings discovered by its own attributes and serves as the material basis for their new identity—in this case, the medium being color and the material basis belonging to visual actuality; that is, the viewer ignored what the object offers to perception of its own color relationships, its interplay of light and dark, its linear articulation and patterning, its disposition of masses, etc., and, essentially the dominating component of aesthetic expression, what it offers to responsiveness by the qualities derived from the specific dispensation of those features, of weightiness, structural orderliness, solidity, power, monumentality, rigidity, and so on.

III

Nevertheless, we can hardly be wrong in assuming that Cézanne's expression resulted from his interaction with a world in which Mme. Cézanne's appearance played a part (indeed, such appearances are an inseparable aspect of visual experience) and that his reference to the source of his episode of response, made as it is in terms of the perceivable attributes of his medium, is important to the aesthetic identity of the object. It is impossible, that is, to avoid the conclusion that the illustrative facts contribute something to what the created entity expresses, for there is a visually apparent difference between color saying solidity of color and color saying solidity of figure; in other words, the illustrative tells us not only something about the absent subject, Mme. Cézanne (which information, as we noted earlier, is irrelevant to the expressive meaning of the object and, therefore, inappropriate to understanding it), but also something about the qualities of the painting as an object communicative of its own meanings. It specifies them, becomes of their nature, and, in effect, like the difference for us between hearing someone say "I am angry" and "I am angry about what he did," it helps to fill out, to complete the expression of the qualities discovered by providing them a context reflexive to the artist's response. We find such substantiation an intrinsically rewarding feature in the activity of perception; thus, in its power to complete the meaning of the qualities expressed,

the illustrative does in its own right afford a satisfaction to our interest that is of an aesthetic nature, and this is so whether it functions in an aesthetic or a practical cause.

Art is a body of work intended for the sharing not of information about the world *per se* but of human response to the world encountered. It cannot, however, but be directed toward making as intelligible as possible the nature and substance of that encounter; it must, therefore, take hold of enough of the material basis for response, the common ground of experience to which we all have access, to substantiate and delineate the artist's discoveries, and the more he has to say, the more extensive need that ground be.* In the fact of its referential nature, illustration offers the possibility for incorporating into the expressive object the common ground of the things and events of which daily living is composed; it allows one to be arm-in-arm with the artist as he responds to the world around him; the eyes are shared, so to speak, and what happens as a result of this sharing is that we may partake far more extensively (as he, also, himself realizes it more explicitly) of what belongs to the artist's experience as we command the means for apprehending the nature of his re-creation, his personal, purposive adjustment of the material of the surrounding world. It is in this sense that the illustrative serves Cézanne's aesthetic intent: his experience, taking place in terms of the medium of color, is the more fully and, therefore, more satisfyingly communicated because the information he gives allows us to share in, to understand, the significant circumstance of his encounter; that circumstance is not Mme. Cézanne's appearance, but Cézanne's own concrete activity of perception and response.

As it functions to specify the qualities and to ally them to a familiar context, illustration serves both to enrich the possibility of, and lend a sense of conviction to, the aesthetic

* Common ground implies, of course, that appropriate past experiences of our own be brought to bear in the understanding of new material: a knowledge of some words is the *a priori* requirement for understanding the meaning of a new verbal idea; a knowledge of Tintoretto for understanding what El Greco has to say; a measure of experience in human relationships for comprehending such a character as Conrad's Lord Jim.

identity of a work of art, and in so supporting the artist's intent, it becomes qualitative rather than informative—*i.e.*, of the object in its presentation of the values intrinsic to the medium of expression: thus it happens that in many of Cézanne's portraits, figure says, in the same sense that color, surface texture, etc., say them, solidity, weightiness, power; it says them as an aspect of the medium. At the same time, however, the illustrative nevertheless retains a special significance in its distinctive allusive power; it is, in some degree, also of that which it represents: figure saying solidity, at times even saying mountain-like solidity, is different from mountain saying it, for we, as responsive creatures, cannot help but attach consequence to the identity of the things we know. In that fact lies the most important aesthetic function illustration may serve: its potential for drawing directly into an object shaped by human expressive intent a sense of the meanings those things of the world have had, to impart to a work the reverberating echoes, however blurred or strong, of the multitude of responses the complex world of our everyday experiences has elicited and, then, to give them back to the originals with the new values, the qualities which the artist's usage has brought into being, so that in what once was to us—grand as it may have been—only nature's mountain, we can now see Cézanne's discoveries, Renoir's, Giotto's, El Greco's, indeed, those of any creative artist whose work we have seen for its expression of his aesthetic understanding—grander still and richer in meaning than it ever could have been without that exchange of quality between the artist's work and the matter of the world.

IV

There is one more phase of this topic to consider—namely, illustration as a means in relation to the various media of expression. On the evidence of our cultural heritage, we may reasonably say that we have settled upon three modes of experience for the enactment of our most significant aesthetic communication: these are the visual, the auditory, and the ideational (apprehension and response by way of symbolic entities); and the corresponding media are painting, music,

and literature.* The canvas, the symphony, the poem are objective in the same sense that accidental reality is, but they differ explicitly from what is offered by nature in having been made under the direction of an individual's intelligence and personality to convey human meanings. At the same time, however, each medium possesses some degree of an independent identity, *i.e.*, it is of intrinsic meaning to human perception without the intervention of the human hand: painting, as I indicated earlier, is made up of color, which in any situation has an impact, a sensuously stimulating effect, of its own; music represents a special case of the sounds which naturally form a perceptible, moving aspect of the world around us; literature results from the appropriate selection and ordering of words, which, themselves an instance of objectified understanding, have the autonomous effect on human sensibility of conveying an ideational meaning. It is by way of the native identity of these media, their having in their apprehensible state the substance to elicit a response from us, that they are able to serve a communicative purpose, but we should also be aware of a fundamental difference in the potency of each medium for causing by its own tangible matter an experience akin to that which the artist may make it yield. Illustration, in its function of lending identity to its "container," the created entity, is the principal instrument in the artist's repertoire for compensating for the specific limitation of his medium in this regard.

On the whole, the medium of sound is, of the three, in its basic sensuousness the most intimately and profoundly allied to the full range of human responsiveness; no hearing man can escape sharing in the majesty of thunder, the gaiety of laughter, or the sorrowfulness of weeping, or, indeed, can

* These may be called "pure" media, as opposed to "mixed" (for example, song, dance, sculpture, theatre, etc.), because of the singularity of their perceptual orientation. Having thereby a natural internal relatedness, they are capable of being made to discover and explore meanings of far greater subtlety, complexity, and significance than are the other arts. This is not to say that "mixed" media arts are inferior but that their expressiveness is necessarily dominated by the effort to integrate the disparate parts. That is why I use only the three for my discussion, although what is said is applicable to the rest if their particular multiformity is properly reckoned with.

he remain totally indifferent to the more subtle expressive nuances of sound's less imposing, but no less ineluctable, effective presence. That is, sound is by nature primarily, explicitly, and inclusively qualitative, and its informative function is always secondary to its impact: even when sound occurs as speech, the tone of voice, the character of the sound itself, takes expressive precedence over the meaning of the words used. Indeed, we respond, we attribute meaning to sound as a compulsory physiological and psychological impulse, and it has the power to set in motion all the diversity of possible feeling inborn in us. We need not like what we hear, we may not listen imaginatively or intellectually for a subtlety of relationship, a revelation of a new idea, but we are nevertheless subject will-lessly to be stirred to the very core of our affection by the simple occurrence of sound. In short, sound—and correspondingly, its aesthetic form, music—carries in its own sensible nature the potential for a full qualitative experience. Music is, therefore, unneedful of the substantiating effect illustrative reference may supply and suffers such allusive material as gratuitous, or, at best, thinning or distracting, impositions. And what we are wont to regard as illustrative in a piece of music—the twitter of a bird's song, the instrumental rendering of a train chugging through the mountains or of the tripping footfall of a picture-gallery visitor—is, in reality, merely the pasting up of a musical collage or a *trompe-l'œil* for the ear. Such devices are not aesthetically illustrative: the instrumental rendition no more illustrates the train than a picture illustrates the sound of a train; and it certainly does not illustrate the train's sound, for it imitates it. To put it more generally, illustrative meanings are bound to fail to enrich the expressive significance of which music is capable, for music does not require specification of its qualities for their greater coherence nor does it need the framework of the kind of particularized common ground illustration supplies to enhance or deepen understanding of them. In those instances when the illustrative genuinely enters into a musical experience—as in ballet scores, opera, or "program," "mood," etc., music—the result is a "mixed" medium, in which, though it has its own qualities, the expressive potential of music itself is to a significant

degree sacrificed to the restrictive concern for unifying the disparate matter.


Literature's medium lies at the opposite extreme from sound in that it owes its aesthetic potential to the most minimally self-supporting qualifying sensuous experience. In themselves, words possess only the barest substance of actuality, a substance, indeed, so negligible as to be hardly perceivable as a cause for response, save only as we become aware of its effect; that is, words derive their meaning almost exclusively from our powers of recognition, which is to say they represent the pure act of bestowing identity, of remaking in human terms all the vast array of particular material lying in the field of our awareness. They are, in short, of a wholly illustrative significance. Correspondingly, it is in literature that we find illustration brought to the ultimate flowering of its aesthetic possibility—its capacity to render infinitely specific the broad human qualities which make life of interest; its capacity to join the isolated episodes of understanding one to another because it distills each one to the common substance of ideationality; its capacity to take our interest in an event, a situation, an object and to make it function independently, to adjust its significance to a new purpose, and thus to enrich our understanding of it; its capacity to make selective reference, to extract purposive essentials from a world replete with a chaos of detail, for the most concentrated, precise, explicit, and personal telling of the discovery one wishes to share with mankind; and, as a result of this power of selectivity, its capacity to take apart, lay open to analysis, reorder along lines of special intent, and unify under the direction of sensitive, intelligent human motive the disparate, segmented, compartmental material that presents itself in any way to our experience. In each and all of these activities, the illustrative functions qualitatively: what it contributes as an aesthetic agent is absorbed by the expressive intent it lends particular identity to. And beyond this, illustration has a special power in literature, where, because of its all-important rôle in the identity of the medium, our own activity of recognition, our bestowal of meaning, underlies, like a pervasive sympathetic vibration lending a resonant depth to it, our experience of the artist's work; thereby does

the symbolic medium of words become evocative of, indeed, directly declarative of, the inexpressible. It is, in effect, that we discover ourselves to know what we did not know that we knew, and in this discovery lies one of the most intellectually and emotionally satisfying experiences of which we are capable.

The medium of color assumes the middle position in terms of its sensuous impact and the contribution of the illustrative to its identity: in itself, it neither commands the power of sound for engaging us in deep, complex, fully satisfying experiences, nor does it partake of the comprehensive specificity of meaning to which words lay claim. In these limitations, however, it also finds the unique advantage of having both the greatest natural alliance with the values of the world we know and the greatest potential for endowing those values with the positive qualities implicit in its own identity. Color enters into our experience through our most variously, abundantly, and meticulously informative sense, and, along with its subsidiary effects of line, space, pattern, volume, light, texture, it represents the most elemental component of visual actuality. Alone, it is capable of yielding only the broadest generalities of human meaning, or, at best, meaning tautologically specified by the bare features of the medium: it can, for instance, provide the quality of delicacy, or delicacy of line; weightiness, or weightiness of volume; drama, or drama of color contrast—which says little more than that these qualities have been embodied in a perceptible format. Even so, the painter may gather these means and qualities together into relationships which produce quite new and exciting aesthetic effects. But, while such effects are of relevance to human experience, they hardly account for what it is possible to reveal through the painter's medium. That remains to come about as the qualities are brought into and made to enrich the substance of our significant human encounters. It is to this end that illustration plays a part in the painter's statement: illustration provides the metaphor for telling; it is the bridge between the unique expressiveness of the medium itself and the exciting, engaging, or profound psychological meanings things and situations of the world have acquired for us.

Thus, it makes of these latter a means no less contributory to the revelations an individual artist may present than the physical medium he employs. A painter such as Titian may use the qualities of monumentality achieved through pattern and volume, of color power tempered by color mellowness, of grace and solidity and subtlety in the organization of the basic means to speak all these as terms of human dignity through the illustrative content of a portrait; or a Goya may use light-and-dark drama, forcefully animated rhythmic sequences of line and mass, textural density, sombreness of color to qualify the passion of the human condition presented through the illustrative material of the scenes of "man's inhumanity to man"; or an El Greco may use the meanings derived from his use of the painter's medium—the eeriness of light and color, the intensity and complexity of undulating, sinuous lines and volumes, the intricacy of space-volume relationships, of color and light-dark transitions, the flickering effervescence that suffuses the surface of his canvases, the metallic sheen, the simplicity of the overall effect of this multiplicity of quality—to open new ways of understanding into, new realities of meaning of, those experiences, lent their special human significance by the subject reference, which mark our most intense insights into the nature of spiritual purpose. And, while illustrative content does not by any means guarantee the expressive significance of a given artist's work, those painters who eschew, so far as possible, any allusion to recognizable subject are merely leaving their potential discoveries to the mercies of a shackled medium. What may be said with such a medium as against the medium in full realization of its capacities is as a millpond to the sea.

Unless otherwise indicated, the originals reproduced in the following plates belong to the collection of The Barnes Foundation. All reproductions are of oil paintings except those specified as drawings.



Glackens

Still Life
Private collection

PLATE 2



Glackens

Zinnias

PLATE 3



Glackens

Roller Skaters
Courtesy of The Brooklyn Museum, bequest of Laura L. Barnes

PLATE 4

© 1967, Rutgers, The State University



Glackens

Torso
Private collection

PLATE 5



Glackens

Bouquet






PLATE 7

Chinese

Poet on Mule, with Companion (Drawing)

PLATE 8



Glackens

Self-Portrait

PLATE 9



Glackens

Halley Knitting
Private collection


PLATE 10



Glackens

Nude with Draperies
Private collection

PLATE 11



Glackens

Nude Asleep

PLATE 12



Glackens

Julia

PLATE 13



Renoir

At the Café

PLATE 14



Glackens

Girl in Green Turban

PLATE 15



Renoir

Misia Sert

PLATE 16



Glackens

Woman in Red Blouse

PLATE 17



Glackens

Head of Girl in Profile
Private collection


PLATE 18



Glackens

The Pony Ballet

PLATE 19



Glackens

Standing Nude (Drawing)



Men Tarring Boat

Manet



Glackens

Luxembourg Gardens
In the collection of The Corcoran Gallery of Art





PLATE 22

Manet


The Tuilleries
The National Gallery, London





Glackens

The Raft



Renoir

Red Boat, Argenteuil



Renoir

Bathers in the Forest



Glackens

Strollers in the Square (Drawing)
Courtesy of the Brooklyn Museum, bequest of Laura L. Barnes

Cup of Chocolate

Renoir








PLATE 30

“*The stout papa shrieked . . .*” (Drawing)
Private collection

Glackens

“Dubourg drew from his basket . . .” (Drawing)
Private collection

Glackens






PLATE 32

"Monsieur, I will have satisfaction . . ." (Drawing)
Private collection

Shoppers Going about their Business (Drawing)

Glackens





Glackens

Figures (Drawing)
Private collection



Glackens

Mother and Children (Drawing)
Collection of Mr. and Mrs. Philip F. Newman

Children after School (Drawing)

Glackens





Glackens

In the Park



Glackens

Pedestrians Hurrying across the Square (Drawing)

Krishna

Glackens



PLATE 40



Glackens

An Old Woman "Gave her daughter-in-law a piece of her mind" (Drawing)

PLATE 41



Glackens

Reveller (Drawing)

PLATE 42



Glackens

Studies from Life (Drawing)
Private collection

PLATE 43



Glackens

Trundling a Hoop (Drawing)

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
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